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Anthropologists have long argued that fear of victimisation through witchcraft 
accusations promotes cooperation in small-scale societies1.  Others have argued 
that witchcraft beliefs undermine trust and therefore reduce social cohesion 2. 
However there are very few, if any, quantified empirical examples demonstrating 
how witchcraft labels can structure cooperation in real human communities;  nor 
any estimates of the fitness costs associated with such  labels.   Here we show a 
case from a farming community in China where a label ‘zhu’ was associated with 
exclusion from cooperative networks.  People labelled zhu  were thought  capable 
of  supernatural activity, particularly poisoning food.  The label was usually 
applied to adult women heads of household, and is often inherited down the 
female line.  We find that those in zhu households were less likely to give or 
receive gifts or farm help, or have sexual partners or children, with those in non-
zhu households.  The tag zhu was associated with reduced biological fitness. 
However those in zhu households did preferentially help and reproduce with each 
other, which mitigated the costs of this tag.  Whilst the tag is common knowledge 
to other villagers, and used in cooperative and reproductive partner choice, we 
found no evidence that this assortment was based on cooperativeness or quality.  
We favour the explanation that stigmatisation originally arose as a mechanism to 
harm female competitors.  Once established, fear that the trait is transmissible to 
others helps to maintain a population structure based around this arbitrary tag 
and thus helps explain the persistence a deep-rooted cultural belief.  
 
 
Accounts of witchcraft beliefs have been documented from all world regions, often in 
those communities where formal legal systems were weak or absent 3.  Conceptions of 
witchcraft around the world are heterogeneous, but  share some similarities: notions of 
poisoning are common 4,5; supposed witches were often conceived of as greedy 6 or 
beautiful 7 or those that stand out in any way; accusations arise in the context of 
attribution of blame for illness, death or other misfortunes 1,8, and could arise within 
families9, such as between co-wives 10, or from the wider community 8,9;  harm  could 
often be cured through payments or medicines1; and in some societies the label could 
lead to violent punishment 9.  It was common for women or children to be accused, 
especially older women 2.  In some cases,  witchcraft accusations appear to be a form of 
extrajudicial punishment or scapegoating of marginal individuals, often family 
members9.  In some cases the risk of being labelled as a witch appears heritable1,11.   
Spiteful witchcraft accusations could  arise for revenge, or due to reproductive 
competition, or indeed any form of competition for resources.   
During the course of fieldwork on cooperative networks in a rural population in 
southwestern China, we became aware that some individuals were  stigmatised with a 
cultural label ‘zhu’ or ‘zhubu’ .   The label is related to a type of  taboo associated with 
fear of food poisoning.  Accounts  of zhu mentioned a notion of infection that has some 
parallels with biological parasitism..  Which households were stigmatised in this way 
was common knowledge and people sometimes advised us against eating in zhu 
households. Women were the most likely to be considered capable of poisoning, with 
men most likely to be cited as victims 12.  Accounts suggested accusations could spread 
quickly through villages 13. ‘Zhu’, ‘Zhubu’ or ‘Du’ is sometimes translated as ‘poison 
giving’ or witchcraft 12,. In much of the world,  witchcraft accusations appear to be a 
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form of extrajudicial punishment or scapegoating of marginal individuals, usually family 
members9.  1Here, the label put stigma on to the whole household and was likely to have 
been inherited 7,12.  There are also accounts of households becoming contaminated with 
zhu through bringing valuable, metal  objects into the house13.   However  the origin of  
both historical or more recent  accusations is unclear, even to those who are the subject 
of such rumours11 .    This status was sometimes reported to be a misfortune rather than 
something that was the fault of the stigmatized individuals.  During communal labouring 
on farms, the farm owner usually provides meals  for those who work on their farm all 
day.  Thus communication about a reputation for food poisoning relating to a particular 
household would be detrimental to recruiting help on that farm, or indeed to those from 
that household being considered suitable partners of any kind. 
 
In accounts of this phenomenon in the ethnographic literature of the region, the label  
‘zhu’ in this group, the Mosuo, appears similar to something referred to as ‘Du’ or  ‘Gu’ 12, 
and to the label ‘chao pu xi’  in the neighbouring Naxi 7.  A similar phenomenon has also 
been described in the Qiang, also in southwest China; there accused women, said to be  
outsiders and/or those considered beautiful, are described as ‘poison cats’ and shunned 
5.  There are also strong similarities with ‘poison givers’ in Bhutan11 
11  and with some concepts of witchcraft in Tibetan Nyimba 4.  
Such tags could  be attached to significant sections of the population, contradicting some 
accounts suggesting the phenomenon is marginal.   There are historical accounts of  the 
denouncing  of some women as dangerous in several Indian, Thai and Chinese societies 
occurring on a very large scale.  Whole villages of those labelled ‘pippa’ were described 
in the Yuan in northern Thailand and in the Dai in Yunnan, China 7.  This is thought to 
have  arisen in the context of patriarchal powers attempting to realign gender relations 
away from more female-centred or matrilineal cultures 7.  In Sichuan, China, the Naxi,  
are thought to have switched from a matrilineal to a patrilineal social structure after 
coming under the control of patrilineal Han in the 18th century.  There were accounts of 
large numbers of women being denounced as  ‘chao pu xi’ or ‘keepers of evil spirits’ at 
that time.  The introduction of the Confuscian ideals of female obedience to men was 
said to be associated with large numbers of female suicides in the region,  some accounts 
suggesting many suicides were daughters of the denounced women 7 .   One account 
suggests Mosou households can rid themselves of the label by changing their family 
name from their matrilineal to their patrilineal name14 .    Accounts of the Mosou 
acquiring the label zhu  or du by bringing valuable metals into the household , possibly  
from other ethnic groups 7,13, has parallels with the process of acquiring the label ‘pippa’ 
in the Dai of Yunnan 7.   Such tags appear to have been used as mechanisms for levelling 
or appropriating wealth from women 7,12-15.  
 
Who cooperates with whom? 
In 2012 we collected data on cooperation between households by collecting social 
networks from five villages in rural southwestern China, comprising about 800 
households (see SI).  Social networks were measured in three ways. Demographic data 
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enabled us to identify kinship networks between all households, including where 
children were living (in the case of this population fathers often do not live with their 
children due to the prevalence of duolocal residence 16; see SI).  We also played some 
simple economic gift games with a sub-sample of households, in which individuals were 
allowed to give gifts of money (provided by us) to up to three adult individuals resident 
in any other household in the study site (see SI).  And finally we collected data from 
working groups on a sub-sample of farms, during planting and harvest time, to identify 
who was helping whom in their fields.   This resulted in four measures of the 
relationships between households: biological relatedness between households: whether 
any-one in one household had a sexual partner in another household, whether any-one  
gave a gift in a gift game to another household and whether they helped on another 
household’s farm.   We also played a simple donation game, where  we gave each person 
10 yuan that they could divide between themselves and an anonymous person in the 
same village. This we used as a general measure of within-village cooperativeness.    
After collecting all the social network data and economic game data, we asked a few 
informants from the villages to identify any household that people considered zhu in 
their locality. Those labelled as such comprised 13.7% of all households.  Data on all the 
four measures of social connection (sexual partnerships including marriage, children, 
farm help and gifts) indicated that having the label zhu predicted that household would 
be somewhat excluded from mainstream social networks. The  clustering shown in Fig 1 
shows that zhu households often clustered together in small networks (up to about 10 
households at most) or dyads with each other.  This was especially true with respect to 
reproductive partnerships and children (Fig 1d).  Fig 2 shows the results of a 
permutation test run on each of these networks, which shows that the probability of this 
level of assortment occurring by chance is overwhelmingly unlikely in all four networks.   
Whilst  zhu-labelled households received no less help on their farm and only slightly 
fewer gifts in the gift game overall (Table S1), it is very clear that the gifts and help they 
did receive were more likely to be from other zhu households (Fig 1,2, Table S1, S2).   
There is even stronger assortment with respect to reproductive behaviour;  very few 
zhu had any sexual partners or children in non-zhu households (Fig 1, Fig  2, Table S1, 
Table S2).  
Thus the information we had received from some villagers clearly had salience across 
the population.  Those in households stigmatised by this reputation for poisoning were 
surviving in the community by assorting preferentially with each other, both in terms of 
whom they decided to help and give gifts to, and whom they chose as partners and 
spouses (Fig 2, Table S2).   Biological relatedness was the main factor that mediated 
social networks extending between households tagged as zhu and those that were not 
(Table S2c).   
This self-assortment appeared to counter some of the costs that would otherwise be 
caused by exclusion from mainstream social networks. Those households with the tag 
zhu were not necessarily poor; in fact they were ranked as slightly wealthier than 
average (Fig S1; Table S4), (it should be noted that land was redistributed according to 
household size soon after the formation of the People’s Republic of China, so historical 
differences in land-holdings did not persist into current generations).  There is very 
limited dispersal from their natal village for zhu and non-zhu: 82.6% of non-zhu and 
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82.3% of zhu either never left their natal household or had dispersed to another 
household within their birth village (Table S5).  In most respects, the household 
characteristics of those labelled zhu are not atypical of other households in the 
population.   The households reported to contain zhu were not necessarily clustered 
geographically (see Table S6).   Nor was there any evidence from the donation game that 
they were any less cooperative toward the village than any other villagers; the 
distribution of donation sizes were almost identical between those with and without the 
tag (Table 2).   
Almost all women in the  population had children (Fig S3), although government 
legislation in the 1980s  restricted fertility to 3 births per women,  which is reducing  
variance in reproductive success.  However Fig 3 shows that female heads of zhu 
households have lower than average reproductive success. This suggests that their 
exclusion from mainstream social networks was costly to fitness (Table S6).  Although it 
is also possible that those with low reproductive success could have been more likely to 
attract the label.  Males in zhu households did not appear to suffer significant fitness 
costs from being in households tagged with this label (Table S7).  Age at first birth was 
not associated with the label zhu (Table S8).  It is a possibility that in many cases the 
accusation against women occurred when already adult, (a woman in Bhutan reports 
how she was ostracised for being a ‘poison giver’  in middle age, and she notes that her 
mother had suffered the same fate).  The harmful effects of exclusion may only take 
effect later in life (as zhu were considered to be more dangerous when older).   It 
appears that assortment with other tagged individuals clearly mitigated the costs of 
ostracism by those who were not tagged. 
As our data on this cultural tag are not longitudinal, we are unable to verify the claim 
that this form of stigmatisation was inherited over generations (in the sense of some 
mother/daughter correlation in the risk of acquiring the label); but the strong 
reproductive assortment suggests this is likely.   Zhu were in fact more closely related to 
each other than they were to non-zhu.  Within villages, mean (SD) genealogical 
relatedness between zhu was r=0.152 (0.163) and genealogical relatedness between 
non-zhu was r=0.125 (0.144), whereas average genealogical relatedness between zhu 
and non-zhu is r=0.083 (0.096).   Whilst they might be considered as an out-group, there 
is no evidence that Zhu migrated in from elsewhere, at least in recent times, nor that 
they are more likely to have moved villages (Table S4).  
 
Discussion 
This study presents the first quantified empirical demonstration of assortment into 
cooperative networks on the basis of  a label associated with supposedly harmful 
supernatural powers, and of the fitness consequences associated with this label.  Such 
tag-based assortment can have evolutionary consequences when, by making 
competitors appear as suitable or unsuitable as partners, their fitness can be enhanced 
or harmed.  In this case, the tag was used for avoiding cooperation with differently 
tagged individuals, especially women, including avoiding reproducing with them.  
However there were enough tagged households for them to ameliorate the costs by 
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helping each other and assorting into their own cooperative and reproductive networks.  
Whether reputational damage through stigmatization is a mechanism for enforcing 
norms, or whether it is simply the harming of competitors, or both, it does appear to be 
a mechanism by which the population is structured.  Thus we illustrate how mutually 
cooperative groups or sub-populations can arise on the basis of assortment on an 
arbitrary cultural tag.   
Many of the characteristics of being labelled as scapegoats for harmful events, as 
described in the abundant ethnographic literature on witchcraft accusations, find 
parallels with social evolutionary theories for maintaining cooperation through the 
strategic use of cooperation and punishment.  Some theories and laboratory 
experiments suggest cooperation between unrelated individuals might emerge due to 
assortment on cooperativeness 17-20.   One study claims that cooperators assort in a 
mobile forager population 21; but spatial assortment might be easier in nomadic groups 
than in settled farmers.    Third party punishment involving reputational damage to 
defectors might be more prevalent in sedentary populations, where the option of 
‘walking away’ 22,23 from uncooperative neighbours is not a readily available strategy.  
There is some evidence that participation in collective tasks for the public good can 
enhance the social networks of more cooperative  farmers 24.   However, we find no 
evidence in this study, either from real world behaviour or economic games, that those 
labelled zhu are uncooperative.  Hence our study, whilst showing strong evidence for 
assortment on the basis of a tag, finds no  support for the hypotheses that assortment is 
based on cooperativeness;  so we cannot claim that this harmful tag is punishment for 
selfishness.   
We favour  competition as a more plausible explanation for the  origin of cultural tags  
that stigmatize certain individuals or households.   A comparative study in Africa 
suggests that  societies where there are strong witchcraft beliefs report low levels of 
trust in a questionnaire;  witchcraft beliefs undermine inter-household cooperation 
rather than promote it 2.  This view fits with anecdotal accounts of fear of witchcraft 
accusations disrupting cooperation, which can undermines participatory approaches to 
poverty alleviation 25.   We have shown previously, in this region, that there are lower 
levels of cooperation with other villagers in those societies with low rates of female 
dispersal, such as this one, when compared with those societies in the region where 
female dispersal rates are higher 26.  Societies with low dispersal also have higher 
relatedness between households.   Qiang villages where witchcraft beliefs have been 
described as prevalent are also characterised by low dispersal 5.  Thus, in sedentary 
groups, where dispersal is low and relatedness high, competition between households 
may be more intense and more likely to generate attempts at reputational damage 
through the use of harmful cultural tags.   Our finding that this label is more likely to fall 
on slightly wealthier and female-headed households fits with anecdotal accounts from 
other populations of accusations arising out of jealousy or spite, directed particularly at 
women7,25.   The difficulty in establishing the precise origin of rumours may make the 
process of stigmatizing others relatively low cost to accusers.   The ecological conditions 
in which this cultural tag has persisted has some  features  predicted to enhance the 
possibility that spiteful behaviour can evolve 27.  It is also possible that villages with 
some residents that were feared for having dangerous powers may have gained some 
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protective advantage against outsiders 5;  that could be one reason why ostracised sub-
groups, whilst shunned by the majority, were nonetheless tolerated within the 
community.  One origin myth describes some Mosuo travelling to the Naxi to gain this 
dangerous power as they thought it might be useful in conflict with enemies 7. 
Whilst one would expect cultural beliefs  relating to supernatural powers to decline with 
education,  witchcraft beliefs in Africa have been shown to be surprisingly resistant to 
‘modernisation’ 2.  It was clear  from our observations that many villagers did fear 
tagged individuals as a risk of contamination and avoided visiting their houses; whilst 
other villagers said they did not believe this.   However, in any cultural system where a 
harmful tag is considered able to contaminate others, even those who do not believe 
tagged individuals to be dangerous might nonetheless incur costs were they to assort 
with tagged individuals, as they would themselves then run the risk of ostracism.  In 
other words, ‘non-punishers’ may be  punished, so long as at least some of the 
population  hold these beliefs.  Third party punishment can itself act as a signal28 , in this 
case of not being part of the stigmatised group.  This may explain why such deep-rooted 






Research ethics were approved by both University College London research ethics 
committee (ref 0449.002) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing (ref IOZ12015). 
Demographic and socio-economic surveys were conducted in five villages in Sichuan 
province during 2012.  One adult was interviewed on behalf of all household members 
about details including name, age, sex, ethnic group, names of spouses and parents. 
Pedigrees were created by linking each person in the census to their mother and father, 
which was then used to calculate genealogical relatedness between individuals. 
Relatedness between households was the mean relatedness between all the individuals 
in the alter and ego households (see SI). 
In 2013, participants played a gift games in which they gave gifts to other individuals. 
Participants were endowed with 15 yuan (equivalent to pay for a few hours work 
locally), which they could give—in five yuan denominations—to between one and three 
recipients of their choice who were resident in any of the study villages. Then the 
participants played a within-village donation game in which they were given 10 yuan to 
split between themselves and another anonymous, randomly allocated player from their 
village. 
Spot observations of people working on farms were conducted during the planting 
seasons of 2011 and 2012 and the harvest season of 2012. Locations were randomly 
sampled within the study villages, giving unbiased, although incomplete, coverage.  
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Wealth ranking of households was conducted by 1-3 key informants in each village. We 
presented them with cards representing the heads of each household; they then divided 
the cards into three piles: rich, medium, and poor. The villagers further divided 
'medium' into another four piles, leaving a total of 6 piles of households: very rich (1) to 
very poor (6). The people who did the wealth ranking were usually current or former 
heads of that village who were familiar with every household (note that wealth ranks 
can only be interpreted within the context of each village). 
Whether a household was considered zhu by the community was common knowledge in 
every village and those considered zhu in each local area were identified by some-one  
resident in that area.    
Statistical analyses 
We used Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) regressions to model the effect of being labelled a 
zhu house on the amount of help observed on its farm and the number of gifts received 
from other households (both measures of in-degree). ZIP models account for over-
dispersion—in this case, an ‘excessive’ number of households with in-degree of zero—
by assuming there are two ‘types’ of household: households whose in-degree is 
generated by a Poisson process, and households with a zero probability of having in-
degree > 0 (i.e. households for which no farm work was observed due to the random 
sampling of households). ZIP models thus estimate a Poisson model for the count data 
alongside a logistic regression predicting the log odds that a household had in-degree = 
0; both are interpreted in the standard manner. The ZIP models controlled for 
household size, wealth rank and sex of the household head, and included village as a 
categorical variable. This analysis did not include village A because only a few 
observations were made there and none included helping on zhu farms. This left n = 660 
households.  
We used multilevel Poisson regressions to analyse the relationship between presence or 
absence of the zhu label and reproductive success (RS), measured as number of living 
children, with varying intercepts for villages (for Fig 3, Table S6-S8).  These models were 
fitted separately on female and male household heads (n = 352 and 379, respectively). 
We fitted Cox regressions to determine the effect of being known as zhu upon age at first 
birth (AFB). Models were fitted separately on adult (aged 15 years or older) females and 
males (n = 1,625 and 1,641, respectively). We used logistic regression to examine what 
factors predicted if a household was labelled zhu  or not (n = 514) Table S. Note that this 
is a model of households, unlike the RS and AFB models, which were models of 
individuals. 
For the RS, AFB and ZIP analyses, we used a model selection approach on sets of a priori 
candidate models, using model averaging as appropriate29. See SI Tables for further 
information. 
To measure assortment based on the zhu label, we calculated assortativity coefficients30 
on the farm labour, gifts, partners and children networks. We ran permutation tests to 
generate a null distribution of assortativity coefficients by simulating 1,000 random 
networks with the same properties as the real networks: i.e. the same numbers of gift 
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givers or farm helpers,  the same number of connections to recipient households, and 
the same proportion of people labelled zhu in the networks. 
We used 'join count' statistics to examine whether zhu houses were physically clustered 
in the study villages. Join counts test the extent to which the occurrence of zhu 
households at spatially adjacent locations is due to chance31. 
Analyses were conducted in R 3.332 . The packages used are given in the SI.   
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Fig. 1. Networks of observed (a) farm work, (b) gifts, (c) partners, and (d) children 
living in other households for one of the study villages. Nodes represent households 
with a tag ('zhu'; squares) or not (circles). Nodes are coloured by cluster membership as 
assigned through an edge-betweeness algorithm (a and b) or ‘fast-greedy’ algorithm (c 
and d). Arrows show links between household for each of the four networks. Instances 
of farm help depended on the amount of fieldwork conducted per village and gift-giving 
depended on whether households chose to participate in the games; so the absence of 
either should not be taken as absence of cooperation. Networks were produced using 
the igraph package in R 3.3, with a Fruchterman-Reingold layout. Spatial location in the 
figures is arbitrary and does not represent spatial location in the village. Individual 






Assortativity on whether households contain zhu for the four social networks (see Table 
S3 for sample sizes). Red diamonds show observed assortativity coefficients. Boxplots 
represent null distributions generated from a permutation test of 1,000 random 
networks with the same numbers of nodes, edges and zhu labels as in the observed 
networks.  Thus the probabiity of the observed levels of assortment being random is 






Fig. 3. Fertility of  household heads. Model-averaged parameter estimates with 
unconditional 95% confidence intervals predicting number of living children for  adults 
aged 15 and over, including (A) female heads of households (n = 363) and (B) male 
heads of households (n = 394). In all cases, the response variable was number of living 








Table 1.  Donations to an anonymous villager in a simple economic game.  
Each player was given 10 Yuan.  They decided how much they would like to keep and 
how much to give to an anonymous, randomly selected villager.  Using Wilcoxon rank 
sum test to compare player’s offer to an anonymous partner between individuals from 
zhu and non-zhu households, we found that there is no difference between them 
(N=564, W = 18903, p-value = 0.7282).   
 
Offer 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10    Sum 
Non-zhu 19 4 37 25 44 178 35 10 69 16 47 484 
Zhu 3 1 4 4 9 27 10 2 8 3 9 80 
% offers             
Non-zhu 4 1 8 5 9 37 7 2 14 3 10 100 
Zhu 4 1 5 5 11 34 13 3 10 4 11 100 
             
  
